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Abstract-The need for the combined performance and reliability analysis of fault tolerant systems is increasing. The common approach to formulating and solving such problems is to use (semi-)Markov reward models. However, the large size of size of state spaces is a problem that plagues Markovian models. Combinatorial models have been used for modeling reliability and availability of complex systems without paying the price of large Markov models. However, assumptions of two-state behavior of components (and that of the system), independence assumptions of component state transitions, and restricfive repair assumptions decrease the potential of combinatorial models for realistic systems. We propose a combinatorial algorithm for the combined performance and reliability analysis of coherent repairuble systems with multistate components, allowing interdependent component state tmnsitions. An example illustrating the algorithm is also presented.
I. INTRODUCTION
Markov and Markov reward models are commonly used for performance, dependability, and performability evaluation of computer and communication systems. However, the number of states in Markov models of realistic systems tends to be rather large, creating difficulties in generation, storage, and solution of such models. Combinatorial reliability models take advantage of the system structure and avoid generation and solution of the underlying Markov model. Two terminal networks and fault trees are examples of such combinatorial models. The limitations of these combinatorial models are due to inherent assumptions of stochastic independence, two-state behavior of their components, and restrictive repair assumptions.
If we consider the Markov model underlying a combinatorial reliability model, then we see that the states of the Markov model can be partitioned into two subsets: operational and failed. Likewise, each component also is in one of two states. In combinatorial models, the problem structure is then exploited to obtain expressions for the probabilities of these two subsets in terms of individual component probabilities without generating the Markov model. Combinatorial techniques are used to generate a model for each system state, s k , reflecting the dependencies introduced by the multistate to binary model conversion as well as the intrinsic dependencies in the system modeled by the EBRM approach. We then employ an algorithm due to Satyanarayana and Prabhakar [4] (henceforth referred to as algorithm SP) for the two terminal reliability computation of the network. This result is interpreted as the probability of the system being in state Sk. This could be a time dependent parameter, if the probabilities of the components in the network models are time dependent.
If the measures of interest for the analysis are combined performance-reliability metrics, a reward rate is assigned to each system state, and existing formulas are used for the computation.
The main contribution of this brief contribution, therefore, is a combinatorial performance and reliability model algorithm that can be applied to coherent multistate systems with stochastically dependent multistate components under shared repair assumptions, i.e., one repairperson for more than one component.
Work on three state device models has been done in [5] and [6] . Unlike the three state device model solutions, our algorithm allows the multistate models to be heterogeneous, Le., the components and the system can have different number of states each, with the number of states of any component or the system being any positive integer, possibly greater than three. The three commonly used solution techniques for binary combinatorial models are inclusionexclusion, sum-of-disjoint-products solutions based on pathset and cutset enumeration, and factoring. A factoring solution for multistate models is given in [7] , and a solution based on pathsets and cutsets , is described by Janan [8]. In this brief contribution, we use a form of the inclusion-exclusion formula for the solution of combinatorial coherent multistate models by generating only noncancelling terms.
In addition, our algorithm allows stochastically dependent repairable components, and is used for the combined analysis of performance and reliability for increased applicability.
In Section 11, we define the notation and state the assumptions used in this brief contribution. In Section 111, we present a general algorithm MSMS (Multi-State Model Solution) that can be used for any heterogeneous coherent multistate system. In Section IV, we give an example to illustrate the use of this algorithm including its applicability as a combinatorial reward model solution method.
NOTATION AND ASSUMPTIONS
The notation used in this brief contribution is listed below: 
ALGORITHM
A system and its components may have multiple states by definition of system operation. This algorithm is applicable to such systems. Altematively, a system may consist of only binarylmultistate components, but the repair assumptions may be that several components share one repairperson. To model this, construct a dummy multistate component for the binarylmultistate components that share a repairperson. The states of this dummy component are composites of the states of the original components. The multistate models are then converted to binary models by using a literal for each state of each component and for each state of the system. This generates stochastic dependencies between the binary literals. At this point, also reflect in any inherent stochastic dependencies between components by modifying the binary combinatorial network models to EBRM's. These are then solved using algorithm SP. This algorithm has been chosen from among several network reliability modeling algorithms as it provides an efficient formula by generating only noncancelling terms while allowing the binary components to be stochastically dependent. Measures that reflect performance and reliability are computed using the state probabilities and reward rates for the system states. Other measures of interest that can be obtained using this algorithm are the probability of system failure, system state probabilities, and availability.
Section 111-A discusses the use of multistate components to model repair assumptions more general than the "independent repairperson per component" assumption that is usually made in combinatorial modeling. Relations between literals C j , that cause the corresponding binary components in the models i u k , k = 1, 2, ... , m , to be mutually dependent are listed in Section 111-B. Section 111-C briefly describes the approach used to build and interpret EBRM's. Section 111-D summarizes the main steps in the SP algorithm. The high level structure of algorithm M S M S to construct and solve models of coherent heterogeneous multistate systems is described in Section 111-E.
A. Multistate Combinatorial Models f o r Repairable Systems
One way to model repair in a combinatorial model, assuming an independent repairperson per component, is using hierarchical techniques [3] . Multistate models can be used to change this restrictive repair assumption for combinatorial models. If there is one repairperson for a set of two-state components, Cj, j = 1, 2 , . . . , u, create a dummy multistate component C m that is an aggregate of these components. Component C m would then have a maximum of 2" states. The one repairperson assumption applied to such multistate components would thus capture a more general repair assumption than the one independent repairperson per binary component assumption. The example in Section IV illustrates this approach.
D. Algorithm SP
Reference [4] gives a topological formula for the two terminal network reliability for coherent systems. The network could be nonseries-parallel, contain unreliable vertices or links, directed or undirected links, and possibly have s-dependent elements. We shall briefly describe the algorithm in this subsection so that a reader could follow the examples without a detailed understanding of algorithm SP itself.
The algorithm generates only noncancelling terms that correspond to the p-acyclic subgraphs of the original network. A p-acyclic subgraph is an acyclic digraph (directed graph) in which every link is in at least one path from the source to the terminal vertex, and there is exactly one vertex s from which all other vertices can be reached, and exactly one vertex t which can be reached from every other vertex. The procedure used to determine the p-acyclic subgraphs of the network is to generate a rooted directed tree, details for which can be obtained from [4].
The next step in the procedure in algorithm SP is to identify the sign associated with each term, i.e., with each p-acyclic subgraph. The sign is given by (-l)'-"+', where b and TZ are the number of edges and vertices in the p-acyclic subgraph, respectively.
The joint probability of the set of edges and vertices in each p -acyclic subgraph along with its sign is a contributing additive term in the resulting two terminal reliability expression.
B. Stochastic Dependence

E. Algorithm MSMS generate multistate components, if components have shared repair.
Three sets of relations hold between the binary literals Cj, [l] .
) A component j cannot be in 2 states at the same time:
1) Redefine components to reflect repair assumptions. This may C j , . C j , = 0,
2) A component j is necessarily in one of its states:
2) Define binary random variables for each multistate com&nent and for the system: 
3) The complement rule is:
4) Any dependence between the multistate components in the original system is carried over to dependencies between the binary literals in models Mk.
The same relations hold between system state literals s k , k = 1, 2 , . . . , m .
C. Event-Based Reliability Models
In a binary system, component failures often are not stochastically independent. Similarly, in a multistate system, component state changes may not always be stochastically independent. One approach used in binary systems for modeling stochastically dependent failures is through conditional probabilities of failure. A problem with this approach is that the number of conditional probabilities required is exponential in the number of dependent components. To avoid this, an alternative approach using Event-Based Reliability Models (EBRM's) is proposed in [2] . Failure causing events are modeled by "event elements" which are added to the affected links in a network model, where the affected links represent the components that have dependent failures. If the event element is "down," then the component (link) is also down. All event elements on a link should be "up" for the component to be "up." This strategy has been used in our algorithm after the conversion of multistate models to binary network models. An illustration of EBRM's is provided in the example of Section IV.
3) Generate combinatorial binary models for all but any one state of the system' using variables C j , : 
VSk
(6)
4) Convert the combinatorial binary network models to eventbased reliability models to account for stochastic dependencies between components, if any. 5) Apply algorithm SP to solve each binary model Mk, k = 1, 2 , . . . , m -1 for Pk(t), i.e., the probability of the system being in state k at time t . System state probability for S, is given by:
k = l 6) From system state probabilities, compute measures as needed. For example, we can compute the expected instantaneous reward rate, which captures both performance and reliability: m where T k and Pk(t) are the reward rate for system state k, and probability of the system being in state k at time t, respectively. Availability of the system can be computed as A ( t ) = 1 -P 3 ( t ) .
(9)
3e failed stales 'Without loss of generality, we have assumed that the state for which a model is not constructed is S, .
IV. EXAMPLE
A multistate repairable array processor system with stochastically dependent multistate components is modeled for combined performance-reliability measures.
A. System Description
The SRE (Successive Row Elimination) configuration of a 5 x 5 array processor system [IO] is modeled in this section. In this configuration, failure of any processor in a row leads to elimination of the whole row of processors. Each processor has two states-failed or functional. The system can be in 1 of 6 states depending on the number of functional rows. The system reward rate in each of its states is equal to the number of functional rows in the array processor system. Each processor has a constant failure rate of A. Each row of processors has an independent repairperson. Repair rate per processor, p, is assumed to be a constant. Software for these processors is developed using 2-version programming. The two versions are SWI and SW2. Software version SWI is used in the processors of rows 1 and 2, while version SW2 is used in the processors of rows 3, 4, and 5. Conservatively, we assume that a fault in software module SW1 causes all processors in rows 1 and 2 to fail. Similarly, a fault in software module SW2 is assumed to cause all processors in rows 3, 4, and 5 to fail. Each software module is also assumed to have constant failure rate 6 and a constant repair rate y.
B. Application of Algorithm MSMS
This system is coherent, and hence it can be modeled using algorithm MSMS.
Step 1: As five processors in each row have shared repair, we create one multistate component per row. As all processors in a row are identical, each of these multistate components, referred to as "rows," can be characterized by 6 states corresponding to the number of processors functional in each row. If the processors in a row are not identical, we would need Z5 = 32 states for each "row" multistate component.
Step 2: The five multistate components, rows, are identified as C1, C2, C3, C4, C5. The binary literals corresponding to component (row) C, are given by:
cj, = 1, if k processors in row C j are functional, IC = 0, 1,. . , 5 .
(10) Two components, C6 and C7, are used to represent software modules, SW1 and SW2 , respectively. These two components are binary with the functional state being denoted by 1 and the faulty state by 0. Thus, binary literal C61, for instance, denotes software module SW1 being functional. Binary random variables corresponding to the system states are defined as follows:
Step 3; Each system state is modeled with a combinatorial block diagram as shown in Fig. 1 . If a row is in any state other than state 5, it implies that at least one of its processors has failed, and hence the row itself is eliminated.
Step 4: Components C1 and C2 are stochastically dependent on the state of component C6. Event E1 is used to denote a functional module SWI or, equivalently, E1 = C61. Similarly, event E2 = C71 denotes that the software module SW2 is functional. To reflect these dependencies, EBRM's are constructed for models M 4 and M3 as shown in Fig. 2 and 3 , respectively. Similar EBRM's can be constructed for the other models of the SRE system. The EBRM for model M q (Fig. 2) is obtained by adding events E1 and Ez to the appropriate links in model M4 of Fig. 1 . Event E1 appears in links that represent binary literals and c 2 5 , and event E2 appears in links that represent binary literals (235, C45, and C55. Nodes marked A through W in Fig. 2 and SW2 , we consider the first two rows of the array system as SET I, and the latter three rows as SET 2. There are four combinations in which exactly three rows are functional. These are:
1) both rows in SET I, one of the rows in SET 2, and both SWI and SW2 are functional;
2) one of the rows in SET 1, two of the rows in SET 2, and both SWI and SW2 are functional; 3) neither of the rows in SET 1, all three rows in SET 2, and both SWl and SW2 are functional; and 4) software module SWl has failed, i.e., the two rows in SET 1 are not available, and all three rows in SET 2 and software module SW2 are functional.
These four combinations are shown as the four paths in Fig. 3 .
Step 5: A hierarchical approach is used for model solution. The hierarchy consists of models at two levels, referred to as higher-level and lower-level models. The higher-level models are the combinatorial models shown in Fig. 1 and their corresponding EBRM's. The lower-level models are Markov chains used to model repair behavior of row components and the software modules.
The higher-level models M I , Mz, M3, and M4 are equivalent to networks consisting of parallel links. A network of parallel links with stochastically dependent components can be solved using algorithm SP. Model M 5 consists of a series connection of five independent literals. This is hence readily solved. The resulting equations for system state probabilities are:
Pz(t) = P(Sz, t) = 10(P(cj5))2(1-P(Cj5))3P(C61)P(C71)
(1 -P(Cj5)) (13)
(16)
All rows have identical processors, and hence in the solution above, P(Cj5) is used to denote the probability of any row being in state 5, i.e., have all its processors functional. Fig. 4 shows the lower-level Markov model for the states of any row component, Cj. Assuming X = 0.0001 per hour, and p = 0.33 per hour, the Markov chain shown in Fig. 4 is solved for the probability of the row being in state 5. The steady state and transient probability of being in state 5 in the Markov model P(Cj5(t)), is obtained using SHARPE. Software modules SWl and SW2 are each assumed to have constant failure rates 6 = 0.001 per hour and repair rates y = 20 per hour. Each module is assumed to
have an independent repairperson. The lower-level Markov model for each of the two software modules is a two-state model (Fig. 5) with rate 6 causing the UP-to-DOWN transition and the rate y causing the DOWN-to-UP transition. This model is solved for the steady state and transient probability of being in the UP state, P(C61), also equal to P(c71). Thus, the lower-level Markov models provide solutions for P(Cj5), P(C61), and P(c71).
Equations (12)- ( 16), obtained by solving the higher-level combinatorial models and their EBRM's, are evaluated for their numerical values using SHARPE [3].
For illustration purposes, a simpler assumption of no repair for the processors and the software modules, leads to P(cj5) = e-5Xt, P(C61) = P(c71) = e -6 t .
( 18) Equations (12)- (16) are then solved using the results obtained from
Step 6: System reward rates are:
(18).
The expected instantaneous reward rate is given by:
E [ X (~) I
= C r , P , ( t ) = 5 x ~5 ( t )
1=1
+ 2 x Pz(t) + Pl(t).
(20)
The instantaneous reward rate for the system, E [ X ( t ) ] , versus time, t, for the SRE configuration with and without repair is plotted in Fig. 6 . With repair, the probability of each row being in state 5, reaches steady state. So does the system being in each of its 6 states.
Hence, E [ X ( t ) ] levels off at a value greater than 0. Without repair, the probability of each row being in state 5 keeps decreasing with time. Eventually, all rows are in the failed state 0. The system with no rows has a reward rate of zero. So in the steady state, E [ X ( t ) ]
for an array processor system with SRE configuration without repair reaches zero. Using the Markov approach instead of the multistate combinatorial method, a Markov chain with 12 states and 34 transitions is needed for the no-repair case. With the original assumption of shared repair per row of processors and repairable software modules, the Markov model is much more complex, since the repair transitions must reflect the stochastic dependencies of the processors on software modules, SWI and SW2 . The model would be even larger if all processors are assumed to have different characteristics. The goal of this example, however, was not to demonstrate a comparison to an equivalent Markov model, but to illustrate a new combinatorial technique of creating dummy multistate components for flexible repair assumptions. This illustration would enable a system architect/modeler to apply algorithm MSMS to systems that require shared repair assumptions and yet are large enough that a Markov model would be too unwieldy.
V. CONCLUSION
To avoid the problem of large state spaces in Markov and Markov reward models, we described an algorithm MSMS to solve coherent combinatorial multistate models, where components can be heterogeneous (have different number of states) to obtain combined performance and reliability measures. Systems can have components whose state transitions may be stochastically dependent. Also, repair assumptions for system components are flexible, allowing several components to have shared repair. We presented an example of a multiprocessor array system with s-dependent components and shared repair, to illustrate the application of algorithm MSMS.
